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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to understand whether international trade may
enhance innovation and growth through an increase in competition. We de-
velop a two-country endogenous growth model, both countries producing the
same set of goods, with rm specic R&D and a continuum of oligopolistic
sectors under Cournot competition. Since countries produce the same set
of goods, trade openness makes markets more competitive, reducing prices
and raising the incentives to innovate. More general, a reduction on trade
barriers enhances growth by reducing domestic rmsmarket power.
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1 Introduction
During the last two decades the volume of international trade has increased enor-
mously, among developed countries in the 80s and extending to developing coun-
tries in the 90s. This increase in trade volumes is contemporaneous with several
attempts to create regional integration agreements, as for example the European
Union and the MERCOSUR. There is a common belief that these changes have
turned out into a larger more competitive environment, whose consequences for
rms productivity and growth are still subject of controversy. While the EU and
the OECD countries have carried out policies to stimulate competition, some voices
alert about the impact of foreign competition on the productivity of domestic rms.
In this paper, we stress the positive impact on economic growth of the pro-
competitve role of international trade. Our paper is motivated by recent empirical
studies both at the rm and the industry level suggesting that the rise in com-
petition coming from globalization has a no negligible positive impact on rms
investments in innovation. For example, Harrison et al. (2006) evaluate the im-
pact that di¤erent reforms carried out by the European Union under the Single
Market Program have had in innovation intensity. They nd that these policies
have increased both competition, measured as a reduction in markups, and inno-
vation intensity, measured as R&D expenditures over sales, leading to productivity
growth in the manufacturing sector.
In models of endogenous growth, where technological progress is the result
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of rmsprivate decisions, international trade a¤ects the incentives to innovate
through di¤erent channels: The reallocative e¤ects due to specialization can have
an impact on growth if sectors present di¤erent scopes for technological progress
(Grossman and Helpman, 1991); openness to trade promotes the exchange of
knowledge leading to growth, the so-called knowledge spillovers (Rivera-Batiz and
Romer, 1991, and Devereux and Lapham, 1994). However, in all these studies
trade openness gives little space to competition, because of the monopolistically
competitive nature of markets and the assumption that innovation is carried out
by potential entrants. In Rivera-Batiz and Romer, for example, markups only
depend on the elasticity of substitution among varieties; moreover, openness to
trade increases the market size and the number of rms in the same proportion,
leaving innovation rents unchanged. It is only under the existence of technological
spillovers that innovation is fostered. Finally, their paper fails accounting for the
empirical evidence cited above since it predicts constant average markups after
trade liberalization and ignores, by assumption, the reaction in terms of R&D
investments of incumbent rms.
More recently, the literature on competition and growth has developed models
in which incumbents are allowed to upgrade their own technologies. The seminal
work by Aghion et al. (2001) points out the escape from competition e¤ect as
an incentive to innovate in highly competitive environments. In a di¤erent paper
Peretto (1999) considers an extension of Romers (1990) model, by adding cost-
reduction innovations and strategic interaction among rms. A rise in product
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market competition produces higher growth by reducing the number of rms, which
increases markups and makes rms to innovate more. Therefore, there is a trade-
o¤ between competition and growth, since higher growth is associated with lower
number of rms and higher markups. Peretto (2003) extends the previous exercise
to trade openness, and shows that it reduces both the global number of rms and
R&D costs due to technological spilloversrising the incentives to innovate.
The model in this paper is a two-country economy with R&D activities being
undertaken by incumbents. Di¤erent from the literature cited above, both coun-
tries produce the same set of varieties, each variety being produced by n rms
in each country under Cournot competition. When countries open to trade, it is
not the mass of varieties that changes but the number of rms competing in each
variety. This approach has many important advantages for the study of the com-
petitive e¤ects of trade openness. Firstly, an increase in competition is modelled
by an increase in the number of competitors o¤ering the same product.1 Note that
in this framework, other measures of competition like markups, market shares or
market concentration reduce when the number of rms increases.2 Second, R&D
is undertaken by incumbents and innovation is rm specic, implying that the
return to innovation depends crucially on rms size. An increase in the number of
rms has two opposite e¤ects on rms size: A market share e¤ect, by increasing
1In Aghion et al (2001), competition is measured by the elasticity of substitution between
di¤erent varieties. However, as Koeninger and Licandro (2005) point out, the elasticity of sub-
stitution is an element of the environment reecting preferences or technology. They claim that
changes in the elasticity of substitution results on di¤erent e¢ cient allocations, which may be
confounded with the associated change in competition.
2An interesting discussion about the measurement of competition is in Motta (2004).
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the number of competitors, it reduces individual market shares; and a competition
e¤ect, by increasing competition it has a negative e¤ect on markups, increasing
the size of the market. Third, trade openness a¤ects growth through the com-
petition e¤ect only, since the reduction in the domestic market share su¤ered by
local rms is compensated by their participation in the foreign market.3 Finally,
it is important to say that this paper studies the case of economic integration
among similar economies where openness to trade intensies competition within
the exiting industries rather that giving access to di¤erent goods produced abroad,
something more frequent in cases of North-South trade.
The paper succeeds in obtaining a positive growth e¤ect of trade openness
as a consequence of the increase in innovation generated by a more competitive
environment. Since the number of rms a¤ect innovation non-linearly, the paper
shows that gains from trade are larger the less competitive countries are in autarky,
as rms would be more reactive in these environments. More generally, the paper
shows that trade barriers reinforce domestic rmsmarket power leading to a
decrease in innovation and growth. This paper is related to the recent work by
Neary, who successfully introduces olipolistic elements into general equilibrium
theory by assuming a continuum of sectors and an oligopolistic market within
each sector. In this framework, the impact of trade liberalization on production
and trade patterns is analyzed in Neary (2002), and the impact on wage inequality
3We do not consider technological spillovers, isolating the pure e¤ect of competition on
innovation.
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in Neary (2003), but still no work has explored its consequences for innovation and
growth.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we present the basic model in
autarky and we try to understand what are the forces driving growth. In section 3,
we allow for free trade in the case of two identical countries. Section 4 concludes.
2 Autarky
Consider an economy populated by a continuum of consumers of measure L; with
instantaneous logarithmic preferences dened over two nal consumption goods X
and Y ,
1Z
0
(lnCxt + lnC
y
t )e
 tdt;  > 0;
where Cxt ; C
y
t represent consumption levels. Good Y is an homogeneous good.
4
Good X is a Dixit-Stiglitz composite good dened in a continuum of industries of
measure N :
Cxt =
0@ NZ
0
xjtdj
1A
1

;  2 (0; 1) ;
where xjt represents consumption of good j: Each individual is endowed with one
unit of labour at each point in time. In order to nance R&D activities, rms
issue shares, At; which pay a rate of return rt. Let us take the homogeneous good
4The existence of a traditional good allows for the reallocation of labor to the R&D sector
without necessarily reducing labor assigned to the composite good sector. A similar result would
arrive under the assumption of an elastic labor supply as in Aghion el al (2001). When the e¤ect
of trade openness to employment is a key issue, this alternative would preferable.
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as the numeraire (i:e: pyt = 1): The representative consumer budget constraint is
given by:
_At = wt + rtAt  
NZ
0
pjtxjtdj   Cyt ; A0 > 0;
where wt is the wage rate, and pjt is the price of good j:
Good Y is produced by a continuum of rms of measure one with technology:
Cyt = L
y
t ; (1)
where Lyt represents labour allocated to this sector. Sector Y is competitive im-
plying that wt = 1.
Each good j in X is produced by n rms in an oligopolistic environment. A
rm i in j produces using technology (let us omit the subscript j for simplicity)
qit = zitL
x
it; (2)
where zit is the stock of knowledge, which is assumed to be rm-specic. Firms in
X can also invest in R&D activities leading to a reduction in marginal production
costs. The R&D technology is
_zit = (L
z
it)
 zit;  2 (0; 1) ; (3)
7
where Lzit represents labor allocated to R&D.
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At any point in time rms in j decide the quantity to supply and the optimal
allocation of workers to both activities, physical production and R&D, taking
into consideration other rms strategies. This game belongs to the family of
di¤erential games, or repeated games dened in continuos time, in which past
actions a¤ect current payo¤s. Two di¤erent concepts of perfect Markov Nash
equilibria have been proposed in the literature, the open-loop and the closed-
loop Nash equilibrium. This paper focuses in open-loop Nash equilibria (OLNE),
mainly for two reasons. Firstly, for simplicity, since under certain assumptions
standard optimal control theory techniques can be applied in order to nd OLNE,
and secondly, because in models without uncertainty every OLNE is a closed-loop
Nash equilibrium, (CLNE).6 In an open-loop Nash equilibrium rms decide at time
t = 0 the optimal path of strategies taking other rmspath strategies as given. In
this sense an open-loop Nash equilibrium is equivalent to a static Nash equilibrium
where the possible strategies are time-paths of actions and the payo¤s associated
are innite sum of payo¤s.
Let ai = [qiT;LziT ] ; 8 T  t be rms i strategy, where [qiT;LziT ] are the time-
paths of output and R&D workers, and let us call 
i; the set of strategies of rm i.
Let Vi be the value of rm i when the v rms in the market, n  2, play strategies
5Since we are focusing on the e¤ects of a pure increase in competition on growth, no techno-
logical spillovers are assumed consistently with Aitken and Harrison (1999) ndings of little or
no evidence of technological spillovers coming from international trade.
6In a model without uncertainty the information sets, at time t and at time t+ s, relevant to
take the optimal decisions in t+ s are the same, therefore every open-loop is also a closed-loop
Nash equilibrium. See Fehrstmann and Mueller (1984).
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An = [a1;a2;:::::::; an] :
Denition 1 At time t, An = [ai; a i] is an open loop Nash equilibrium if
Vi [An]  Vi [A0n]  0;
where A0n = [a
0
i; a i] ; 8 a0i 2 
i:
This condition implies that the optimal time path of strategies ai maximizes
the value of rm i taking as given other rmsstrategies, (a i); and that the rm
value has to be non-negative.
2.1 Solving for the autarkic equilibrium
Consumers solve the standard optimal control problem dened above. The optimal
conditions are
Ext = E
y
t = Et; (4)
_Et
Et
= rt   ; (5)
pjt =

LEt
xjt
1 
Pt; (6)
where Ext ; E
y
t are individual expenditures in goods X, Y , respectively, i.e.,
Ext =
NZ
0
pjtxjtdj
9
and Eyt = C
y
t : In the following, we use the notation Et to refer to both. The price
index of the composite good X is given by
Pt =
0@ NZ
0
p

 1
jt dj
1A 1 :
Firm i producing good j solves the problem:
Vis = max
Z 1
s
Rs;t
 
(pjt   z 1it )qit   Lzit

dt; s.t. (7)
pjt =

LEt
xjt
(1 )
Pt
xjt =
nX
i=1
q
_zit = (L
z
it)
zit; 0 <  < 1
zi0 > 0;
where Rs;t = e 
R t
s rd is the usual market discount factor. Deriving rst order
conditions, rearranging terms and applying symmetry, we get:
qt = ztlEt; (8)
1 = vt(L
z
t )
 1zt; (9)
z 2t qt
vt
+ (Lzt )
 =
  _v
v
+ rt; (10)
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where vt is the costate associated with variable zt and   n 1+n is the inverse of
the markup rate. Note that equilibrium is symmetric under the assumption that
the initial stock of knowledge is equal for all rms in all sectors, i.e. zi0 = z0;8 i.
As it can be seen in the last term of equation (8), the relevant scale is the number
of workers per rm, l  L
nN
.
The left hand side of condition (10) is the marginal gain of accumulating one
more unit of knowledge, and it can be decomposed in two parts: the rst consisting
on the reduction in marginal production costs, which are proportional to the quan-
tity supplied, and the second representing learning by doing in research. Notice
that the benet of a cost-reduction innovation depends on the quantity produced,
since it determines the amount of saved resources following such a reduction.
Given that the quantity produced determines the innovation e¤ort, the way
in which quantities are decided is fundamental for growth. This is in equation
(8). In particular, we are interested in understanding the e¤ect of a change in the
number of rms on the incentives to innovate. In our model, an increase in the
number of rms generates two di¤erent, opposite forces. On the one hand, the
market share of each rm reduces, which can be seen in the last term of condition
(8), since l = L
nN
. This is the size e¤ect or the market share e¤ect. On the other
hand, the markup 1

depends negatively on the perceived elasticity of demand n
1  .
Consequently, an increase in the number of rms has a positive e¤ect on quantities
by increasing the inverse of the markup, represented by the rst term on the right
hand side of (8). This is the competition e¤ect.
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The labor market clearing condition is
nN(Lxt + L
z
t ) + L
y
t = L: (11)
The nancial market-clearing condition implies that the aggregate asset demand
LAt is equal to the stock market value of rms:
LAt = nNVt: (12)
Finally, let us impose the market-clearing condition in sector Y :
LEyt = L
y
t : (13)
2.2 Balanced growth path
A Balanced Growth Path (BGP) is an equilibrium path in which variables Lxt ;
Lzt ; L
y
t ; rt; Et; E
y
t ; q
y
t ; are constant and qt; zt; vt; pt grow at a constant rate. The
following proposition shows that it exists and is unique.7
Proposition 2 An interior BGP exists and is unique
Proof. Combining (3), (8), (9) and (10), under _Lzt = 0, we get
(Lz) 1lE = :
7In Appendix B, we also show that the economy jumps to its BGP at the initial time.
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Substituting the latter equation, (2), (4), (8), and (13) into the labor market-
clearing condition (11), we get
f(Lz) 

1 + 




(Lz)1  + Lz = l: (14)
Since f(:) is monotonically increasing, and satises the limit conditions limx!0 f(x) =
0 and limx!l f(x) > l, existence and uniqueness derive directly from the interme-
diate value theorem.
2.3 Output growth
In this economy, production in sectors Y and X do not grow at the same rate.
Consistent with national accounts, let us dene growth by the mean of a Divisia
index, meaning that the growth rate of real output is equal to the growth rate of
both nal sectors weighted by the share of each sector on nominal output. Since
the homogeneous sector is not growing, and preferences are logarithmic, the growth
rate of output is
g =
1
2
_q
q
=
1
2
_z
z
=
1
2
(Lz) :
Technical progress only a¤ects sector X, making the growth rate depend on the
amount of labor allocated to research in this sector.
 is the inverse of the markup and may be seen as a measure of the degree of
competition. By di¤erentiating (14), the growth rate can be easily shown to be
increasing in . This is what we have referred before as the competition e¤ect.
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There is a positive relation between the degree of competition and the perceived
elasticity of demand, which depends positively on both the number of rms n and
the elasticity of substitution . As we have commented before, an increase on
 leads rms to increase the quantity produced. Given that innovation can be
exploited in a large number of units, rms increases innovation too. This result is
the opposite to that found in monopolistic competitive models, where a rise in the
elasticity of substitution decreases the markup and reduces the innovation rate.
When incumbents carry out process innovation, the scale of operation becomes an
important determinant of R&D decisions. The rise in the perceived elasticity of
demand increases the quantity supplied and therefore the return to innovation.
3 Free trade
Let us assume that countries are identical. Since both economies are equal in factor
endowments and initial stocks of knowledge no pattern of specialization from trade
is observed and all the gains from trade comes from an increase in competition.
Let us assume that transportation costs are of the iceberg type; precisely, (1+)
units of the product must be shipped in order to serve 1 unit abroad, where  > 0
is the percentage of total production that disappears in the process of shipping.
Notice that for foreign rms selling in the domestic market, the markup in autarky
has to be larger than the transportation costs, meaning that there is trade i¤  < 1

.
Let us assume it in the next.
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Under international trade, rms are able to serve both markets so some clar-
ication about the notation must be made. Let us dene the quantity qcht as the
quantity supplied by a rm located in country h to market c, where c; h 2 fA;Bg.
That is qABt is the quantity supplied by the B-rm to the A-market. Whenever only
one superscript appears it indicates that the variable is dened for that economy,
that is, ExAt would be the expenditure assigned to X by households located in
country A:
Under symmetry, rst order conditions for country A under free trade are:

lExAt
qAAt + q
A
Bt
1 
PAt

(n  (1  )) qAAt + nqABt
n(qAAt + q
A
Bt)

= (zAt )
 1; (15)

lExBt
qBBt + q
B
At
1 
PBt

(n  (1  )) qBAt + nqBBt
n(qBAt + q
B
Bt)

= (zAt )
 1(1 + ); (16)
1 = vAt (L
zA
t )
 1zAt ; (17) 
zAt
 2
(qAAt + (1 + )q
B
At)
vAt
+
 
LzAt

=
  _vAt
vAt
+ rt: (18)
Conditions (17), (18) are identical to conditions (9), (10) except from the fact
that in (18), when computing the return on innovation, rms take into account
quantities supplied to both markets. Conditions (15), (16) determine the optimal
quantities supplied in each market and are analogous to condition (8), but one for
each market. Notice that rms do not supply the same quantities to both market.
B-rms solve an identical problem and their rst order conditions are equal to
those of country A but changing the subscripts and the superscripts, from B to A
15
and viceversa.
In order to complete the denition of an equilibrium allocation, market clearing
conditions need to be added:
nN(Lxht + L
zh
t ) + L
yh
t = L; h = fA;Bg ; (19)
LAht = nNV
h
t ; h = fA;Bg ; (20)
L(EyAt + E
yB
t ) = L
yA
t + L
yB
t : (21)
3.1 Balanced growth path
A balanced growth path for this economy is a symmetric equilibrium in which
variables Lxt ; L
y
t ; L
z
t ; Et; E
y
t ; rt; q
y
t are constant and variables zt; q
A
At = q
B
Bt; q
A
Bt =
qBAt; vt; pt grow at a common constant rate (we have omitted some supraindexes).
Proposition 3 Under  < 1 
n 1+ , a balanced growth path exists and is unique
Proof. See Appendix A.
As shown in the appendix, equilibrium conditions can be reduced to the fol-
lowing equation in Lz
f (Lz) =

1 + 




(Lz)1  + Lz = l; (22)
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which is in fact the same equation than in autarky but with given by:
 =
(2n  1 + )(2(1  )(1 + ) +  2(1    n))
n(2 + )2(1  ) : (23)
The question is whether the growth rate of technological progress is higher
under free trade than under autarky or in another terms, whether  > :
Proposition 4 Under  < 1 
n 1+ , 
 > :(The growth rate under free trade is
always higher than in autarky)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Trade openness has no e¤ect on the r.h.s. of equation (22) because neither local
resources, nor the local number of producers changes. In other words, the increase
in the number of competitors in each country has no size e¤ect, since rms are
at the same time selling in both countries. However, the increase in the number
of competitor has an e¤ect through competition. In the extreme case  = 0, the
markup takes the same functional form as in autarky, but with 2n instead of n as
the number of competitors. A reduction in markups puts the competition e¤ect
at work as already explained in the previous section. Even if rms are selling
less in their domestic market than under autarky, the global quantity they supply
is larger, because of the competition e¤ect. Therefore, openness to international
trade leads to more innovation and growth. Proposition 4 shows that the compe-
tition e¤ect also works under trade frictions. It is important to notice that this
result is not driven by any scale e¤ect, since the number of workers per rm l
17
is equal in both cases, under autarky and trade openness. Now, we proceed to
discuss some comparative statics.
Transportation costs are a barrier for foreign competitors reinforcing the market
power of domestic rms and making the competition e¤ect less e¤ective, as shown
in the proposition below.
Proposition 5 An increase in transportation costs has a negative impact on the
rate of innovation
Proof. It can be easily shown by di¤erentiating (23) with respect to  .
Finally, the di¤erence between R&D investment in both regimes, autarky and
free trade, is small when the number of rms is large. This is due to the fact
that n has a non-linear impact on produced quantities; while for a small number
of rms the reduction in quantities due to free trade is important, for a large
number of rms it has a very small impact. For example, the gains from trade
completely vanish when competition in autarky is at the largest value compatible
with positive trade. Remind that there is trade if and only if  < 1 
n 1+ , or
equivalently i¤ n < 1+

(1  ). It is easy to see that  =  if n = 1+

(1  ).
The fundamental reason is that rmsresponse to the increase in competition due
to trade openness is strong when the autarky level of competition is low, while in a
competitive autarky economy, the response of rms to an increase in competition
is quite small since they already have very little market power.
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4 Conclusions
This paper develops an endogenous growth model with rm specic innovations,
Cournot competition on a continuum of oligopolistic markets and free trade be-
tween identical economies. It shows that international trade induces growth in
participant countries through an increase in competition. The paper di¤ers from
the literature by constructing an environment where openness to trade generates
a pure increase in competition and makes rms to innovate more to prot from
the associated increase in market size. This research reinforces the view that at
least for the case of developed countries trade openness enhances innovation and
growth through an increase in competition.
By restricting the analysis to identical economies, the present paper may be
seen as a contribution to the understanding of the growth e¤ect of regional integra-
tion agreement among similar countries, as it is the case of France and Germany
in the European Union and to some extend Brazil and Argentina in the MER-
COSUR. A natural extension will be the study of economies with di¤erent initial
conditions (i.e. di¤erent technological levels) or di¤erent factor endowments. This
would make possible the study of the interaction between developed and develop-
ing economies, as it is the case of Mexico and the US in NAFTA or the accession
of Ireland and Spain to the EU. Di¤erences in the initial stock of knowledge de-
termine the initial di¤erences in marginal costs and market shares; di¤erences in
market size depend upon di¤erences in factor endowments. The innovation path
19
of both economies will be determined by how these two forces interact.
As a complement to that extension we can explore how di¤erent trade policies
a¤ect the results. The model will predict that unilateral trade policies will reduce
growth in the liberalizing country since the increase in competition coming from
this policy is o¤set by the creation of an articial comparative advantage to foreign
rms. However, preferential trade liberalization agreements, will enhance growth
in the liberalizing countries reducing growth in the protectionist country due to
the fact that, the reduction of trade barriers between the two countries increases
competitiveness of these rms in both economies with respect to rms in a third
country.8
Another interesting extension would allow for sectorial di¤erences. In this case,
it would possible to identify sectors having larger gains from trade. Considering,
for simplicity, intersectorial independence, we suspect that the less competitive
sectors will have larger gains from trade.
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A Free Trade
Proposition 3 Under  < 1 
n 1+ , a balanced growth path exists and is unique
Proof. Under symmetry, zAt = z
B
t = zt; q
A
At = q
B
Bt = qt and q
B
At = q
A
Bt = qt, for all
22
t. Taking condition (15) for both countries, we get
(n  1 + )qt + nqt
nqt + (n  1 + )qt =

1
1 + 

;
implying
qt =
(1  )(1 + )  n
1  + n qt; (24)
which requires
 <
1  
n  1 + 
to q and q be simultaneously positive.
Under symmetry, ExAt = E
xB
t = Et, P
A
t = P
B
t = Pt and pjt = pt for all j and
t, implying that the inverse demand function (6) for any variety produced in any
country becomes
pt =

LE
n(qt + qt)
1 
Pt =
lE
qt + qt
;
the last equality follows from the denition of the price index P: Substituting the
latter condition and (24) in (15) and rearranging terms, it follows
qt =

(1  + n)(2n  1 + )
n(2 + )2(1  )

ztlE (25)
qt =

((1  )(1 + )  n)(2n  1 + )
n(2 + )2(1  )

ztlE: (26)
At the balanced growth path, rt =  from (5), and _zz = (L
z) from (3). From (17),
23
(18), (25) and (26), we obtain:
 (Lz) 1 lE = 
where, by analogy with the autarky case,
 =
(2n  1 + )(2(1  )(1 + ) +  2(1    n))
n(2 + )2(1  ) :
From the labor market clearing condition (19),
Lx + Lz +
Ly
nN
= l:
From (21) and (4), Ly = LE; from (2), q + (1 + ) q = zLx. Substitution q and q
by their expressions in (25) and (26), we get
f (Lz)  (1 + 


)


(Lz)1  + Lz = l;
i.e., is the same equation as in the autarkic model but with  instead of . Interi-
ority and uniqueness of the solution is therefore ensured by looking at the autarkic
balanced growth path proof.
Proposition 4 Under  < 1 
n 1+ , 
 > 
24
Proof. From the denition of  and ,
    = (2n  1 + )(2(1  )(1 + ) + 
2(1    n))
n(2 + )2(1  )
 n  1 + 
n
;
=
(1  )2(1 + ) +  2n(1    n)
n(2 + )2(1  ) :
It can be easily shown that the r.h.s. is decreasing in  , with     = 0 when 
is at its maximum value 1 
n 1+ .
B Stability analysis under autarky
Let us combine equations (2), (8) and (11) to get
Lx = lE
1 + 

Lx + Lz = l;
implying
E =
l   Lz
(1 + ) l
:
By logdi¤erentiation,
_E
E
=   L
z
l   Lz
_Lz
Lz
:
25
From (5),
r =   L
z
l   Lz
_Lz
Lz
: (27)
Adding (3) and (10), we get
_z
z
+
_v
v
= r   q
z
1
zv
= r   l (Lz) 1E = r   
1 + 
(Lz) 1 (l   Lz) : (28)
The second equality emerges after substituting q
z
and 1
zv
by their expressions in
(8) and (9), respectively, and the last one after substituting the expression for E
computed just above. Di¤erentiating (9)
_z
z
+
_v
v
= (1  )
_Lz
Lz
:
Substituting it and (27) in (28), we get
_Lz
Lz
=

  
1 + 
(Lz) 1 (l   Lz)

l   Lz
(1  ) l + Lz

:
The sign of the second term in the r.h.s. is positive since Lz  l. The unique
interior steady state, let us denote it by L, is obtained by equalizing the rst
element of the r.h.s. to zero (condition (14)). As it can be easily seen, _Lz < 0 for
Lz 2 (0; L) and _Lz > 0 for Lz 2 (L; l), implying that the interior steady state is
unstable. Consequently, the only rational expectation equilibrium is Lzt = L
 for
all t  0.
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